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Given the present economic situation the subject regarding the propagation mechanisms of 
financial crisis is of present interest. In these mechanisms, investor behaviour seems to be one of the 
propagation’s causes, and that’s why we think that the study of inventors’ types of behaviour during 
crisis might bring light on this controversial subject. Does any kind of behaviour make a financial 
market "contaminate" other markets? Sometimes, during crisis, the investors behaviour seems to be 
unforeseeable. In this article we will analyze how the investors behaviour may influence the power of 
the financial crisis propagation using the example of the Romanian capital market and we’ll try to 
identify the types of investor behaviour on this market, the Romanian capital market. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The phenomena of financial crisis propagation, namely the crisis that began on 
the United State financial markets, mostly its spread all over the world, drew again 
the  public  eye  on  the  problem  of  the  propagation  of  financial  markets. 
Macroeconomic,  politics  and  trade  links  between  countries  makes  the  shocks 
suffered  by  an  individual  country  or  region  to  affect  other  countries  or  regions, 
which most likely are in the same geographical region. Weak economic bases of the 
second  country,  macroeconomic  similarities,  and  exposure  to  certain  types  of 
financial agents and associated transmission channels can be considered as the main 
factors leading to an increased risk of sudden impact of financial shocks suffered by 
other countries. The stage of development of the international financial system it 
may also play a very important role in this transmission mechanism. Although, much 
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of the propagation of the financial crisis phenomenon is not caused by the irrational 
behaviour of investors, this type of behaviour being only an insignificant factor (or 
so the theoreticians thinks till now), it still remains a mystery what makes countries 
vulnerable to crisis and the precise mechanisms that makes the crisis transmit. 
 
2. The propagation 
 
A phenomenon that affects the international capital markets in general, both 
developed, as well as least developed seems to be the increasing markets’ volatility. It 
is  clear,  however,  that  volatility  will  remain  a  problem  as  long  as  it  delays  the 
adoption  of  specific  actions  taken  at  national  and  international  financial  level, 
measures that may be necessary to reduce these risks and to limit their impact. First, 
the high volatility of international capital flows on the emerging markets and the 
limited capacity to cope with this volatility make the "beneficiary" country vulnerable 
to  excessively  high  shocks  and  crises,  frequently  and  in  a  disturbing  manner. 
Secondly,  the  international  capital  markets  appear  to  be  extremely  susceptible  to 
financial shocks because of the high integration degree. 
During financial crisis, the way the shocks are transmitted seems to uncover a 
different transmition mechanism and this difference appears to be an important one. 
Although  we  known  very  little  about  the  importance  of  macroeconomic  and 
institutional factors in the propagation of financial shocks, empirical studies have 
helped to identify the types of links between countries and other macroeconomic 
conditions that makes a country vulnerable to contagion during financial crisis. At 
the same time, empirical research has helped identify the countries that risk to be 
exposed to contagion and some interventionist policy that can diminish these risks, 
although they were identified in a way that is too general to be helpful. 
When a country is hit by a financial shock, the reduced market’s liquidity may 
compel investors to withdraw capital invested in other countries or markets that are 
not  initially  hit  by  the  crisis.  Because  many  financial  transactions  are  based  on 
investment  decisions  rather  than  on  theoretical  financial  principles  of  individual 
investors,  problems  in  investors’  stimulation  may  also  play  a  role  in  triggering 
volatility. The decision to withdraw the funds invested in multiple markets may also 
reflect  coordination  problems  among  investors  and  mechanisms  insufficient 
developed at the international level, mechanisms that might supervise advice and 
possibly assist countries with problems of liquidity. In reality it is very difficult to 
make  the  difference  between  forms  of  investors  behaviour.  Volatility  can  be 
transmitted from one country to others through common creditors and investors 
that are acting in international financial centers. 
Contagion refers to the migration of market disturbances   mostly those who have 
a negatively impact on the market   from one country to another. This process can 
be observed through the evolution of exchange rates, prices of shares, bonds, and 
capital. The causes of contagion can be divided conceptually into two categories. The 
first  category  focuses  on  cross border  influences  arising  from  the  normal Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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interdependence  between  open  economies.  This  interdependence  makes  shocks, 
whether globally or locally, to be transmitted between countries, because of the real 
and financial links existing between them. The second category involves a financial crisis, 
which  is  not  linked  to  any  observed  changes  in  macroeconomic  bases  or  other 
fundamental  bases,  but  it  is  only  the  result  of  the  investors  behaviour  or  other 
financial agent’s behaviour. 
The propagation of financial crisis depends on the degree of financial market 
integration. If a country is completely integrated into the global financial market, or if 
the financial markets in a region are very well connected, assets prices and other 
economic variables will evolve in parallel or in a similar manner. The higher is the 
integration  degree,  the  greater  would  be  the  contagion  effects  of  a  shock  from 
another  country.  Conversely,  countries  that  are  not  financially  integrated,  mostly 
because of the limited access to the capital markets or the lack of access to the 
international financing, are, by definition, immune to contagion. In this sense, the 
financial markets would facilitate the transmission of shocks, but it wouldn’t cause 
them. Actions of investors, who are ex ante individually rational, and also collectively 
rational, even if they lead to volatility and may require policy changes, should be 
considered to be fundamental causes. 
Therefore, in the context of the recent financial crisis, was supported by some 
experts that foreign portfolio investors (being the ones that are investing in multiple 
markets) may have been those which by their reaction (which had the same effect as 
the market trends) have led to the propagation of the crisis that began in the United 
States (egg, rushing to buy when the market is growing and rushing to sell when the 
market  is  declining),  and  by  their  mutual  desire  to  copy  the  behaviour  of  other 
investors, ignored the information on the economic fundamentals of the countries’ 
markets  on  which  they  were  investing.  We  can  also  add  that  even  the  national 
investors (the ones that invest only in national assets) had a big negative influence 
because they tend to mimic others actions without a proper thinking. 
 
2. 1.Study 
Investors,  like  every  other  man,  are  characterized  by  over exiting  and 
exaggerated reactions, both on rising and falling markets. Most of the investors tend 
to buy or to expend their investments when the market is growing. Simultaneously 
these  investors  tend  to  sell  their  investments  in  short term  assets  with  a  low 
performance.  As  a  result  most  of  the  investors  will  be  holding  assets  from  the 
category of those who had the best performances on short term. By making that, 
their assets price will be over evaluated, and when corrections will take place on the 
market, investors will suffer important losses. 
During a correction on the market, investors tend to panic because of there 
believe that they will loose most of the invested money, and then the most normal 
reaction is to sell everything, in order to minimize their losses. These actions will 




To complicate things even more, the market doesn’t react at all or it doesn’t 
react  in  a  predictable  manner when we  look at  the  short term  evolution. And  if 
investors react this way when small corrections are made on the market, we can only 
imagine what they will do when some important financial crises will appear. It is a 
known fact that the biggest financial crises where also amplified by the massive sell 
of assets, induced by the investors’ panic. It is true that the first turbulences appeared 
because of some problems of the financial system, but investors’ reactions made the 
turbulences propagate to the other countries with same characteristics as the one 
already in it. The most important thing investors should know is that short term bias 
has nothing to do with the long term investment climate. And so, we could state that 
the  market  short term  prediction  is  the  same  thing  with  investors’  behaviour 
prediction, a thing very hard to accomplish. 
The best period to make changes in ones portfolio is in the ascending period of 
the market, because investors adjust their assets portfolios only when they are in 
favorable position. It is practically impossible to predict the best changing period, but 
the  changes  will  take  place  as  long  as  the  investors  are  situated  in  a  favorable 
position.  A  favorable  asset  transaction  doesn’t  mean  selling  assets  with  taint 
evolution and buying assets with a high profitableness, but it means selling profitable 
assets for gaining profit.  
It is necessary for investors to be conscious about their tolerance to risk before 
making any investment in order to make the right decisions. Knowing own level of 
risk tolerance is one of the most important things we should know before starting to 
invest on long term assets. Investing in portfolios that don’t characterize owner’s 
intolerance  to  risk  lead  investors,  during  market  correction,  to  make  important 
changes and so losses rise. It seams like its human nature to make these corrections 
during  the  declining  market.  To  prevent  these  kinds  of  manifestations,  investors 
should  try  to  develop  investment  strategies  by  taking  into  consideration,  besides 
financial goals and aims, risk tolerance. 
So,  it’s  clear,  that  emotions  shouldn’t  have  anything  to  do  with  financial 
market’s investment, when the aim is getting a profit. As long as these will be part of 
the investment strategies, it will be hard to predict the market’s reaction as a whole 
during crises periods. 
To analyze the influence of investor behavior, we chose to pay attention to the 
reaction of Romanian financial market during the last financial crisis or as some say 
the current one. The current financial crisis’ starting point was the fall of sub prime 
market  in  the  United  States  in  August  2007.  This  fall  had  triggered  a  series  of 
negative effects on the global financial market: first the U.S. government had to enter 
the financial markets by helping financial institutions in difficulty and then lowering 
FED’s (Federal Reserve System) reference interest rate in order to relaunch the real 
economy. However the measures taken could not stop the propagation of financial 
crisis on other financial markets. 
Being  an  open  market,  the  Romanian  capital  market,  can  be  influenced  by 
external events, meaning that by definition could be the country hit by the contagion Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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effect. However, to measure contagion influences in Romania during the current 
financial crisis we also have to take into account the links with other countries such 
as  trade  links,  macroeconomic  links  and  policy  links.  If  the  Romanian  financial 
market reacts in the same manner in which other countries did, countries that are 
linked  to  Romania  in  this  way,  it  not  shows  contagion  but  only  shows  the 
interdependence between Romania and this others countries. We can consider the 
evident dependency between Romania and the European Union. Past studies shown 
that the correlation between Romania and EU is approximately 0,5 (see „Contagion 
causes – rational or irrational behavior”, 16
th International Economic Conference – IECS 
2009, R.D.Vilag et al.). 
The period of data collection for Romanian and European indices is of 2 years, 
from 21 February 2007 on 19 February 2009, daily recordings (without weekends and 
holidays).  We  used  this  period  in  order  to  include  both  the  period  before  the 
beginning of the crisis on US sub prime market and the period extended till after the 
last drop in the global stock exchange, i.e. 15 October 2008. 
 
If we analyze the behavior of the Romanian market and that of the Euronext 
market  (we  can  consider  this  particular  market  representative  for  the  European 
Union). We can see from the fist part of the figure no.1 (until first of August 2007) 
that although the general trend of the two indices is the same, namely it shows a 
growth, the two indices do not evolve in an identical manner. There are common 
points only when price falls and the last part of the BET graph recorded a higher 
growth than the Euronext index. We can also compute the correlation between the 
two indexes, and we obtain 0, 56 that shows an average correlation between the two 
markets. This correlation can be determinate by the classical links: trade, policy and 
macroeconomic bases or by simply looking at the capital market. 
On the middle part of this figure (until first of June 2008) we can see that the 
two  indexes  are  starting  to  evolve  in  the  same  manner.  In  fact  computing  the 
correlation  between  them  we  obtain  0,  91.  This  shows  a  very  strong  correlation 
between the two markets. Given the fact that the classical link channels did not 
change in this period, we can make the assumption that this is due to the influence of 
investors behavior. In fact if we watch trading statistics on BVB we see that both 
residents and non residents investors react to the financial crisis. If in 2007 we had a 
total  sum  of  purchasing  stocks  of  almost  14.000  millions  lei,  in  2008  this  sum 
dropped to almost 6.700 millions lei (half of 2007 total). 
At the end of this figure we see that the indexes’ evolution is almost the same. 
The  correlation  reached  the  value  of  0,98;  that  is  almost  a  perfect  correlation 
between the two indexes and of course between the two markets. 
If  we  add  to  this  the  fact  that  the  residents  withdraw  almost  half  of  their 
investments between 2007 and 2008 and the non residents almost disappear from the 
market we can see that this rising in correlation is given by the investors behavior. 





Figure no.1 “The evolution of the two indexes between 21 February 2007 
and 19 February 2009” 
 
So our study over investor behavior has an important starting point and we can 
easily identify different emotions aroused on the Romanian market. 
 
2.2. The influence of emotions 
 
2.2.1. Ambiguity adverse 
Ellsberg paradoxes (Ellsberg 1961) suggested that people are ambiguity adverse, 
and by being that they determine the apparition of irrational choices. As Camerer 
(2008) suggested ambiguity adverse could lead investors to demand a growing risk 
premium,  more  ever,  when  investors  are  being  presented  with  new  financial 
opportunities, because of the uncertainty of the economic environment and of the 
resulted incomes. 
In financial crises’ case, ambiguity adverse is shown by the fast transactions, 
made by those who want to sell the stocks with massive losses, without waiting for 
the situation to clarify. This phenomenon can be observed only when the capital 
market is falling. 
So, in order to make our point, we can monitories the reaction of the investors 
who were on BVB – Romanian capital market (Bursa de Valori Bucuresti)   during 
the  falling  of  the American  sub  prime  market.  Before  the  fall,  in  July  2007,  the 
situation on the market, shows that the only ones who have trade and by doing that, 
“gain” loses, at the end of the month, were the residents institutional investors, with 
a  total  loss  of  135.448.730,06  lei.  Still  the  market  summarized  a  net  gain  of 
105.075.202,12 lei. In august 2007, when the crisis started the only one that gained Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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were individual residents investors with a total of 86.789.243,70 lei. In august the 
market  summarizes  losses  of  86.089.428,64  lei.  So  the  situation  of  trading  fast, 
without waiting to see what will happen made the Romanian market decapitalize as a 
result of this investor behavior. 
 
 
Figure no.2: “The percentage of nonresidents firms sells in total sells of 
firms” 
 
The figure above shows the evolution of non residents firms sells on Romanian 
market from January 2007 through March 2009. For this period, non residents firms 
had an average of 54,67% in total sells of participants firms on Romanian market. 
The  figure  also  shows  the  tendency  or  the  trend  line  and  as  we  see  these  non 
residents firms are moving somewhere between 60 and 50 %. By computing the 
standard obtain a figure of 11,35; that means that most of the values will have a 
deviation of ±3,37 pp from the average. On the chart are easily observed the higher 
and the lowest value, meaning 77,61% in December 2008 and 29,17% in May 2008, 
which makes our standard deviation seem to big. 
So we can draw some conclusion based on this figure:  
  The non resident firms are not following a long term strategy, their are just 
“going with the flow” (that’s way the swings in the chart); 
   the  non  resident  firms  are  ambiguity  adverse  that  way  the  biggest  sell  on 
November 2008 when the Romanian capital market, like others, have just been hit by 
the latest boom and the Romanian political and economical climate was unstable. 
  




The aversion toward risk, suffering or losses can reflect a calculated avoidance 
of future unpleasant feelings. Still, the moods and the emotions felt today by people 
affect their perception regarding risk choices tomorrow. Generally good tempered 
people are much more optimistic about their choices and their judgments, than bad 
tempered people. The decisional process can also be affected by sensorial senses and 
cognitive experience. 
Affective  moods  contain  information  that  can  be  used  to  conclude  on  the 
surroundings. For example it is possible that a person in a better mood to have the 
patience to make better decisions when the market is dropping, knowing the fact that 
the change of portfolio content must be made when the market is expanding. 
Again, we can exemplify on the Romanian market to. If we look to the monthly 
net purchase/sell wee see that in that year (2008) the individual investors, whether 




Figure no.3: “The percentage of residents non-firms in total purchases of 
non-firms” 
 
If we take a quick look at the figures no.3 and no.4 we can draw the conclusion 
that non firms are trading based on moods and feeling. Why? Because the range of 
values of purchases is between 87,29% and 97,04% in total non firms, but the range 
of values of sells is between 91,38% and 97,63% in total non firms. We can see that 
massive purchases in one month are followed by massive sells in another as the 
example of september octomber 2007 shows as; Romanian investors had 95,96% of 
purchases  of  nonfirms  in  September  and  in  October  when  the  crisis  started  to 




Figure no.4: “The percentage of residents non-firms in total sells of non-
firms” 
 
2.2.3. Self control 
 Assets  investment  for  future  gains  (postponed  consumption)  implies  self 
control by being related to moods and feelings. Experimental studies suggest that 
people are inconsequent over time even when it comes to there choices. As the 
neuroeconomists (Glimcher et al. 2008) stated that may be the process of learning or 
simply  a  mood  change. This  causes  choices’  changes  even  when  there  isn’t  new 
information, either good or bad, about the investment. This type of reaction doesn’t 
need any exemplification on the capital market, because is a well know subject. 
 
2.2.4. Herding 
Still, the most important influences have the mimic strategies by an investor 
from the others, making him to take the same actions. 
Herding, on financial markets, refers to a situation when an investor or a group 
of investors assume others investors trading strategy. The reason for an individual to 
fallow  this  path  is  the  fact  that  he  believes  that  the  others  are  getting  new 
information, information that will help them to make better decisions. In the same 
category it is included the believe that others investor have better knowledge in this 
field. 
Taking  the  case  of  a  stable  market,  this  behavior,  might  influence  market’s 
evolution in short term, but not in a substantially manner on long term. When faced 
with a financial crises, the herding can cause the collapse of some sectors or firms 




From the biological point of view Prechter (2001) brings a new light on this 
behavior. He makes the connection between the herding behaviors in financial with 
an innate humane characteristic   surviving. He explains that when individuals are 
faced with a high emotional situation, impulse creates an unmeasured desire to seek 
signals  from  the  others,  regarding  knowledge  and  behavior,  and  to  line  up  their 
believes and convictions to the ones owned by the group. When a sufficient number 
of investors act in the same way, they will create a state of consensus. This will bring 
a security sentiment among the outsiders, creating a feeling large enough to collapse 
an entire market. 
To make our point we can again use figure no.1. We can see that the BET index 
is following the EURONEXT index and this development is not given by the macro 
economical or political links. As we already stated the market correlation rises from 
almost 0,5 to 0,9 and this is only the investor behavior fault given the fact that the 
Romanian economy reacted some month later to the beginning of the crisis. 
From behavioural finance point of view feeling like fear and greed are the ones 




The contagion phenomena make a very important object of study in our days. 
The investors are using international portfolio diversification in order to reduce their 
risk. Because of the recent development of the financial market (the increased degree 
of integration) this diversification it can not be easily obtained. 
Taking into consideration the above mentioned we can draw a very important 
conclusion about the international financial market, that is: the investor behavior has 
an important influence over the outgoing of this market and more, in time of crisis, 
when extreme behavior is accentuated. 
This can mean only one thing: we need to take a closer look at the investor 
behavior; we need to count their behavior besides other elements that influence the 
global financial market. If we identify every type of investor behavior and the way 
that it influences the evolution of the market we can say that we have half of the 
solution  of  the  present  problem.  The  next  step  that  we  should  take  is  the  one 
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